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The purpose of this paper is trying to estimate the impact of technical barriers to trade
on bilateral trade flows of individual EU countries and to evaluate  the  downward
impact of national border on trade flows (home bias). Here we try and identify the
effect of technical barriers to trade on EU imports applied to data in which sectors
where the EU has sought to introduce harmonized technical regulations to remove
technical barriers to trade (New Approach, Old Approach, Mutual Recognition) as
well  as  an  aggregate  of  sectors  for  which  technical  barriers  are  deemed  to  be
unimportant. Using the gravity model, we find that home bias remains substantial for
products where the EU has sought to introduce harmonized technical regulations to
remove technical barriers to trade but mutual recognition sectors exhibit the smallest
home bias. Based upon the analysis on the evolution of home bias in the EU, we find
no  evidence  that  the  home  bias  has  decreased  for  products  where  differences  in
technical regulations are important.
 Keywords:  home  bias,  gravity  model,  European  integration,  technical  barriers  to
trade.
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Because tariffs on imports among European countries have been eliminated as the
result of the Single Market Program (SMP), there has been increasing interest in the
extent  to  which  technical  barriers  to  trade  (TBT’s)  may  distort  or  restrict  trade.
Possibly, this is also because quantitative measurements of the effects of technical
regulations are burdensome, and indeed, they have been characterized as “…one of
the most difficult non-tariff barriers imaginably to quantify” (Deardorff and Stern,
1998). This reflects in part problems relating to data.  Using calibrated simulation
models, many authors typically assume that technical regulations result in an (ad hoc)
increase in trade costs.  In any event, there seems to be a case for closer examination
on the consequences of technical regulations. This requires a precise quantification
and a comprehensive effort to analyze data at a detailed sectoral level.
Our work differs from other studies in that we examine how differences in technical
regulations across EU countries has affected the pattern of bilateral trade flows of
individual EU countries taking into account the downward impact of national border
on  trade  flows  (home  bias).  For  example,  when  safety  standards  differ  across
countries, consumers may have greater trust in domestic regulatory standards, which
leads to higher trade within a country. Like Nitsch (2000) we use the gravity model
approach, to explain the pattern of bilateral trade flows of EU countries. Using this
model we are also able to assess whether ‘home bias’, which measures the level to
which internal trade exceeds international trade, are more prevalent for sectors where
technical regulations are important and if EU policy towards the harmonization of
national technical requirements has had an impact on the magnitude of the home bias.
The data we use to identify technical regulations is a self-constructed database. We
differentiate  sectors  according  to  a  European  classification,  which  specifically
identifies  sectors  where  the  EU  has  sought  to  introduce  harmonized  technical
regulations to remove TBT’s
1.  The principal mechanisms to eliminate TBT’s in the
                                                          
1 We discuss in more detail the source of this categorization later in the paper.EU have been the principle of mutual recognition (MRP), whereby a product lawfully
produced and sold in any of the EU member states must be given free access to all
other EU markets and where this fails through the use of harmonized standards.  Prior
to  the  Single  Market,  the  ‘old  approach’  dealt  with  a  single  standard  laid  out  in
detailed  technical  regulations  for  single  or  group  of  products  unanimously  agreed
directives of the European Council. In this approach to technical harmonization little
progress has been made since the detailed directives were difficult to agree.  This led
to the ‘new approach’, whereby technical barriers to trade are removed by the setting
of ‘essential requirements’.
In this paper we have several objectives. We use the gravity model in order to discern
the impact of policies implemented in the EU to remove TBT’s and to evaluate the
impact  of  the  economic  size  of  these  barriers  on  home  bias.  Within  this,  we  are
particularly interested to see:
- whether there are differences in home bias when applied to sectors where technical
regulations are not deemed to be a potential trade barrier, to sectors where technical
harmonization is important. Within these latter groups, we  are  also  able  to  assess
whether there are differences in the size of the estimated home bias between sectors
according to the approach adopted to the removal of TBT’s.
- whether the magnitude of the home bias has fallen since the creation of the Single
Market. Within this we are particular interested to see:
-whether the degree of home bias is lower for sectors, which have already been
subjected  to  the  harmonization  of  technical  regulations;  “old  approach
sectors”
2.
-whether  sectors  subject  to  the  new  approach  in  the  EU,  where  we  might
expect the impact of economic integration in the form of the Single Market to
be strongest, have experienced a greater fall in home bias during our sample
period of 1990 to 1998.
                                                          
2 The policy environment in sectors subject to detailed harmonisation under the old approach has
changed little over this period, see CEC (1998).-whether there are significant differences in the parameter values of the gravity
model when applied to sectors where technical regulations are not deemed to
be  a  potential  barrier  to  trade,  to  sectors  where  technical  regulations  are
important. In particular we are interested to see whether various elasticities
differ  between  these  different  groups  of  sectors  and  whether  they  are
characterized by high-income elasticities of demand in importing countries.
This paper continues in Section 2 by a briefly description of the EU approach to the
removal of technical barriers to trade (TBT’s). Section 3 reviews the existing work on
home bias and the gravity model. Section 4 explores the method for estimation while
section 5 discusses the data that are used to examine technical barriers to trade and
section 6 presents the results. Section 7 discusses the robustness of our results. In
section 8 we discuss the interpretation of the estimated home bias and in section 9, we
conclude.
2. The EU approach to eliminate TBT’s
TBT’s arise when differences in national regulations in health, safety, environmental
and consumer protection, may hinder intra-EU trade or render it more costly than
domestic trade. The need to adapt product design, re-organize production systems, and
the costs of multiple testing and certification can entail significant additional costs for
suppliers of exported goods to a particular country. Technical regulations relate to
technical  specifications  and  testing  and  certification  requirements  such  that  the
product actually complies with the specifications to which it is subjected (conformity
assessment) and are the focus of this paper
3.
The removal of TBT’s due to differences in technical regulations amongst member
states is central to the creation of a Single Market in Europe. EU policy related to
technical regulations and testing and certification requirements is currently based upontwo approaches: enforcement of the Mutual Recognition Principle (MRP) and if this
fails, the harmonization of technical standards across member states.
2.1. The Mutual Recognition Principle
The basic EU approach under the principle of Mutual Recognition is that products
manufactured and tested in accordance with the technical regulations of one member
state  can  offer  equivalent  levels  of  protection  to  those  provided  by  corresponding
domestic rules and procedures in other member states. Thus, once a product is legally
certified for sale in any member state it is presumed that it can be legally placed on the
market of any member state, and as such has free circulation throughout the whole of
the Single Market. ‘Mutual Recognition’ tends to apply where products are new and
specialized and it seems to be relatively effective for equipment goods and consumer
durables, but it encounters difficulties where the product risk is high and consumers or
users are directly exposed.
2.2. Harmonization of technical standards
Where ‘equivalence’ between levels  of  regulatory  protection  embodied  in  national
regulations  cannot  be  presumed,  the  EU  has  sought  to  remove  TBT's  through
agreement on a common set of legally binding requirements. Subsequently, no further
legal impediments can prevent market access of complying products anywhere in the
EU market.
Old Approach
The initial approach adopted in the EU to harmonizing technical specifications was
based  upon  extensive  product-by-product  or  even  component-by-component
legislation  carried  out  by  means  of  detailed  directives.  Now  known  as  the  ‘old
                                                                                                                                                                     
3 We do not consider the impact of non-regulatory technical barriers or standards. These are voluntary
and arise from the self-interest of producers or consumers, for example, to improve the information in
commercial transactions and ensure compatibility between products.approach’ this type of harmonization proved to be slow and cumbersome. In the 1980s
the ineffectiveness of this approach was recognized when it became apparent that new
national regulations were proliferating at a much faster rate than the production of
harmonized EU directives (Pelkmans (1987)). This failure arose because the process
of  harmonization  had  tended  to  become  highly  technical  as  it  sought  to  specify
individual  requirements  for  each  product  category  (including  components).  This
resulted in extensive and drawn-out consultations. In addition delays arose because the
adoption of old approach directives required unanimity in the Council of Ministers. As
a  result  the  harmonization  process  proceeded  extremely  slowly.  The  old  approach
applies  mostly  to  products  (chemicals,  motor  vehicles,  pharmaceuticals  and
foodstuffs) by which the nature of the risk is clearly apparent.
New Approach
In the 1980s it became increasingly recognized that there was a need to reduce the
intervention of the public authorities prior to a product being placed on the market. A
key element in the plan to create a Single Market in Europe was the adoption of the
‘new approach’ to technical harmonization under which directives can be adopted by
the Council on the basis of majority voting. The new approach applies to products,
which have “similar characteristics” and where there has been widespread divergence
of technical regulations in EU countries. What makes this approach ‘new’ is that it
only indicates ‘essential requirements’ and leaves greater freedom to manufacturers on
how  to  satisfy  those  requirements,  dispensing  with  the  ‘old’  type  of  exhaustively
detailed directives. The new approach directives provide for more flexibility by using
the  support  of  the  established  standardization  bodies,  CEN,  CENELEC  (European
Standardization Committee for Electrical Products) and the national standard bodies.
The standardization work is achieved in a more efficient way, is easier to update and
involves greater participation from industry.
3. Related Trade LiteratureRecently, following initial work by McCallum (1995) the gravity model has been used
to assess the extent of home bias in consumption. The author finds that Canadian
provinces are about twenty times more likely to trade amongst themselves than they
are to trade with US States after controlling for size and distance between economic
centers. The data set applied by McCallum appears to be unique in identifying trade
amongst the regional subsets of trading partners. He uses a Statistics Canada dataset
for 1988 that consists of imports and exports for each pair of provinces as well as
between each of the ten provinces and each of the 50 US states. Helliwell (1996)
extended  McCallum’s  (1995)  sample  over  the  period  1988-1996  and  confirmed
McCallum results of reporting such a surprisingly high magnitude of intra-national
trade reflecting the importance of national boundaries, given the intense economic
integration between Canada and the US through NAFTA.
Wei (1996) introduces a methodology that ruled out the reliance on national trade data
and constructed a home bias measure based upon the assumption that what a country
imports to itself is mainly the difference between domestic production and exports to
all  foreign  countries.  The  effects  of  crossing  a  border  can  then  be  estimated  by
including a dummy variable and is measured as the antilog of this coefficient. For
internal distances, he estimated the average distance to be half of the distance from the
economic center to the border. When a country has at least one neighbor, then it is one
quarter of the distance to the nearest neighbor. Wei estimated the home bias effect for
OECD  countries  and  finds  on  average,  that  countries  trade  9.6  times  more  with
themselves  than  with  foreign  countries.  When  correcting  the  basic  gravity
specification for trade among countries that share the same language and land border
4,
home bias is reduced to 2.6. Helliwell (1997) revisits the OECD data and extends the
gravity equation with a remote indicator
5 and finds a home bias of 13 separating out
the effect of language from the land border effect.
                                                          
4 These two variables have been introduced by Frankel, Stein and Wei, 1995
5 See section 4 for the definition of the remoteness variable.For the European Union, Wei (1996) finds a very small home bias of about 1.7 and
finds that the border effects for eight EU member countries declined by 50% between
1982 and 1994. He first includes a dummy for any given bilateral trade flow among
EU member states and a second dummy for the observation relating to EU member’s
trade within their own borders. Helliwell (1997) adapts the same methodology but
assigns a dummy for EU bilateral trade flows only. This reflects EU membership and
by deriving the exponential of the difference between the coefficients on the average
home bias of OECD countries and the EU dummy, he reports a home bias of 6.29. In
both studies, the sample includes the language and land border (adjacency) variable.
Nitsch (2000) is the first paper that constructs a sample for EU countries by using a
more detailed data set compiled by EUROSTAT. He finds evidence of substantial
home bias in Europe, with internal trade being on average larger by a factor of ten
than trade with other EU partners and that the magnitude of this home bias declined
during the 1980’s. Contrary to Wei (1996) result, it is interesting to note that this
border effect increases to a factor of 11 after language and adjacency are accounted for
in the model. Instead of using the ad hoc calculation of measuring distances (e.g. Wei,
1996), Nitsch (2000) proposes a new measure for estimating the average of intra-
national distances as a function of country size.
Head and Mayer (2000) apply a gravity approach to sectoral data for the EU countries
and then assess whether there is any correlation between the size of the estimated
border effect and a crude classification of sectors according to the magnitude of non-
tariff barriers (NTB’s). Neven and Roeller (1991)
6 investigate the impact of NTB’s on
the share of EU imports. Both studies conclude that the indicator of non-tariff barriers
cannot explain the variation in the size of estimated border effects and that there is no
relation between declines in the size of the border effect since the creation of the
Single  Market  and  indicators  of  NTB's.  Consequently,  the  authors  suggest  that
consumer preferences must underlie the border effects that were identified.
                                                          
6 Quotes in Head and Mayer (2000)7.  The Gravity Model
The standard framework to account for volume of bilateral trade is the gravity model.
The empirical success can be attributed from the model’s consistently high statistical
fit. Typically in a log-linear form, this model takes its name from the prediction that
the volume of trade between countries is promoted by their economic size (income)
and constrained by their geographic distances. Other important features characterizing
the international exchange of products between countries can easily be added.
This simple form can also be derived from different structural models. Originally,
Anderson (1979) assessed that a sufficient condition for obtaining a gravity equation
is that consumers have both identical homothetic preferences and access to the same
goods  prices.  More  recent  applications  show  that  this  model  is  compatible  with
monopolistic competition models of trade: allowing for economies of scale, (Helpman
(1987))
7, and for technological differences across countries, (Davis (1995)). Deardorff
(1995)  has  preserved  the  CES  preference  structure  and  added  monopolistic
competition  of  a  Hecksher  structure  to  explain  specialization  arising  from  factor
endowment  differences  both  with  frictionless  and  impeded  trade.  Surprisingly,  an
equation  of  this  type  seems  to  work  empirically  for  both  OECD  countries  and
developing countries, and that indeed “just about any plausible model of trade would
yield something very like the gravity model, whose empirical success is therefore not
evidence of nothing, but just a fact of life” (Deardorff, 1995).
Given  its  performance  in  explaining  trade  flows,  the  literature  on  the  effects  of
national borders on trade flows adopted the gravity model. Accordingly, the gravity
model considered here takes the following form:
e g b b b b b a
t ijk
n
ij t nk j t k i t k ij t k j t k i t k t ijk DUM R R D GDP GDP M
, , , 5 , 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 , ln ln ln ln ln ln + + + + + + + = 
                                                          
7 Quotes in Deardorff (1995)where i and j refer to the importing and exporting country respectively and k to the
sector: new approach; old approach; mutual recognition; any combination of the new
approach,  mutual  recognition  principle  and  the  old  approach;  technical  and  non-
technical barriers to trade.
Mijk,t  is the value of imports by country i from country j in year t;
GDPi is the level of income in country i;
GDPj is the level of income in country j;
Dij is the distance between the trading centers of the two countries.
DUMij  are a set of n dummy variables. Separate dummy variables are included to
reflect the effects of adjacency between i and j, the case when i and j share the same
language and to reflect home bias in the level of internal trade (j =  i).
The  economic  variables  in  the  gravity  model  (incomes,  distance  and  remoteness)
define the ‘normal’ level of trade. On the assumption that the gravity model is well
specified the dummy variables seek to capture systematic deviations from this normal
pattern of trade due to physical adjacency, language and home bias. It is important to
interpret the value of the coefficients on these dummy variables in the light of a clear
description of what is meant by the ‘normal’ level of trade. This is necessary for a
precise definition of exactly what we mean by home bias and what the coefficient on
the  dummy  variable  for  home  trade  is  capturing.  We  return  to  this  issue  after
discussion of the data and a presentation of the econometric results.
We follows Wei’s (1996) definition that for any country k, the imports from itself is
the difference between its total production and its total exports to the rest of the world:
(1)                                      X Y M ik ik iik - =
where Yik is total production of country i, Xik are total exports of country i to the rest
of the world and Miik represents imports of country i to itself (‘domestic trade’). A
dummy for the quantity that a country imports to itself captures the home effect.We use a definition of remoteness that has been introduced by Helliwell (1997) and
commonly used in the gravity literature (Wei, 1996; Nitsch, 2000; Deardorff, 1998;
Soloaga and Winters, 2000). The remoteness of importing country i in relation to
trading partner j is given as the weighted average distance between country i and all
trading partners other than j, where the weights are given by the GDP of the trading
partners,
(2)                                /
j k  ¹ = GDPk Dik Ri
This measure is also computed for the exporting country Rj.  If the distance between
the  exporting  country  j  and  other  exporting  countries  k  is  higher  relative  to  the
distance between the exporting country j and importing country i, this will increase
bilateral trade between country i and j. Remote countries (e.g. Australia and New
Zealand) can be expected to trade more with each other than two other countries (e.g.
Germany and Portugal) that are separated by the same distance but are geographically
well positioned near other markets.
The remoteness of EU countries averaged over the period 1990-1998 is plotted in
figure  1.  It  makes  sense  that  countries  such  as  Belgium/Luxembourg  and  the
Netherlands are the least remote while Greece and Portugal have the highest remote
index. An interesting feature of this measure is that UK is more remote than the lower
countries reflecting the closeness of London to other European countries.
Internal distances dii, are taken from Nitsch (2000) which were calculated by using the
disk  area  procedure  to  obtain  the  average  distance  between  economic  centres.  He
shows that the radius of a circle (given by the inverse of the square root of  times the
square root of the area) may be a good approximation for the average distance. For
distances between countries dij,  we  follow  the  conventional  method  in  the  gravity
literature and measure the direct (great circle) distance between the economic centres
(capital cities).5. Data Sources and Methodology
Trade  data  comes  from  EUROSTAT  and  are  collected  at  the  8-digit  level  of  the
European  Combined  Nomenclature  trade  classification,  which  covers  more  than
10.000 products. Our data set comprises bilateral trade flows during 1990 and 1998
between each of the following ten EU countries: Denmark, France, Germany, Greece,
Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom and the remaining
EU countries (with Belgium and Luxembourg treated as one)
8. The sample therefore
covers a total of (10*14) = 140 observations. We derived the trade data according to
the  NACE  industrial  classification,  which  covers  around  100  manufacturing
industries. We utilize information on the sectoral incidence of technical barriers and
the particular approach adopted by the EU to their removal. Trade in each sector was
then aggregated into our four broad groups of new approach sectors, old approach
sectors, mutual recognition sectors, and sectors where differences in national technical
regulations  do  not  constrain  trade  flows,  according  to  the  classification  in  CEC
(1996)).  The  data  come  from  the  detailed  study  undertaken  for  the  Commission’s
review  of  the  impact  of  the  Single  Market  in  the  EU  (CEC  (1998)).  This  study
provides  information  at  the  3-digit  level  of  the  NACE  classification  (about  120
manufacturing industries, see Table 1, 2) of whether trade is affected by technical
regulations and the dominant approach used by the Commission to the removal of
such barriers in the EU.
9 For sectors where technical regulations affect trade, the study
classifies them as those where the barriers are overcome using mutual recognition
(MR), and those sectors where mutual recognition is insufficient or unsuitable so that
either  the  old  approach  (OA)  or  the  new  approach  (NA)  to  overcoming  technical
barriers  is  used.  For  these  sectors  it  is  assumed  that  all  trade  is  affected  by  the
technical regulations and by the identified approach to the removal of the barriers.
There are; however, a small number of sectors where a combination of approaches is
identified, we include these in the analysis, which follows.
                                                          
8Comext did not report trade data for Sweden, Finland, Austria before 1996. Belgium and Luxembourg
are also omitted because there is no production data reported before 1995.We show the overall trade coverage of technical barriers in the EU. The height of the
bars in Figure 2 shows for 1998 for each country, the share of EU imports, which are
categorized as being prone to technical barriers to trade. In other words, we aggregate
the imports of the EU from each country’s exports to the EU across all the sectors,
which are subject to technical barriers to trade. This figure demonstrates that a very
large proportion of intra-EU trade is in sectors affected by EU technical regulations
10.
On average more than 70% of intra-EU imports are in sectors where differences in
technical  regulations  are  important.  The  significance  of  these  sectors  ranges  from
around  75%  per  cent  of  EU  imports  from  Germany  and  Portugal  to  65%  of  EU
imports from Belgium. Thus, there is considerable variation across EU members in
the share of trade affected by technical regulations; however, we also recognize that
this share is not only affected by differing national regulations but also by the level
and composition of import volumes.   
This paper requires bilateral trade and production data in a compatible classification
for 10 European countries over the period 1990-1998. We extracted production data
from the Eurostat New Cronos with reference to the domain of the 'business structural
database'. The long time series, "covering enterprises with 20 persons employed and
more", in NACE revision 1 (code at 3 digit level) were converted to NACE70 (code at
3 digit level) in order to match with trade data extracted from Eurostat  (Comext)
database.  Some  in-between-year  observations  are  missing  from  the  New  Cronos
database. Missing data, then, are approximated by applying a trend of the gross rate of
value-added  (in  quantity)  in  each  NACE  sector.  The  concordance  lists  the  NACE
revision 1 and the NACE70 at a 5 and 4 digit level code, respectively. Finally, GDP,
unit labor costs and population are obtained from the New Cronos database.
                                                                                                                                                                     
9 Trade data according to the NACE classification were obtained from the COMEXT database. The
NACE  is  the  industrial  classification  used  by  the  Statistical  Office  of  the  European  Communities
(Eurostat). A detailed definition of the classification is presented in CEC (1998).
10 Previous analysis of the SMP in the existing EU countries suggests that the removal of technical
barriers to trade may be of great significance. CEC (1998) calculates that over 79% of intra-EU trade
may have been affected by technical regulations in 1996. In the graph, we only consider manufacturing
and include sectors that are prone to Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRA’s), the New Approach, any6. The estimation
6.1.  Total Trade
Following Wei (1996), Helliwell (1997) and Nitsch (2000), we estimate the gravity
model  as  a  system  with  t-equations  between  1990-1998.  We  impose  all  of  the
coefficients  but  the  home  variable  (and  intercept)  to  be  the  same  and  allow  for
correlation  across  the  years  by  employing  the  method  of  seemingly  unrelated
regression (SUR). The basic results for total bilateral trade flows between 1990 and
1998 are reported in the first three columns of Table A1. This gives us an impression
of the home bias in aggregate in order to keep the results comparable with previous
papers before we proceed to a more disaggregate analysis. For the measurement of
internal distances, we take the assumption employed by Nitsch (generally the radius of
a circle or 0.56 times the square root of an area). As indicated by the R
2, about 90% of
the  equation  explains  satisfactorily  the  variation  in  the  dependent  variable  and  all
explanatory  variables  are  highly  significant  (>0.99).  The  GDP  coefficients  for  the
exporting countries (EU15) range from 0.63 to 0.65 while the GDP coefficients of the
importing  countries  (EU10)  are  on  average  0.71.  This  suggests  that  the  economic
space between the bilateral trade partners is fairly balanced; namely, when income
increases with 1%, the volume of bilateral trade increases (less than proportionally) by
about 0.70%.
The  coefficients  of  the  distance  variable  are  significantly  negative.  Similarly,  on
average a 1% increase in distance (as measured here) reduces bilateral trade by a range
between  0.5%  and  1.1%  and  is  on  average  close  to  previous  studies  where  the
consensus estimate is 0.6 (Leamer, 1997). Chen (2000) suggests that reported distance
coefficients  that  are  much  higher  than  the  general  agreed  0.6  elasticity  could  be
explained  by  the  use  of  different  transport  modes.  For  example,  in  the  European
                                                                                                                                                                     
combination of the New Approach, Mutual Recognition Principle and the Old Approach. For a more
detailed analysis, see Brenton, Sheehy and Vancauteren (2001)Union, in 1998, 57.8% of total intra-EU trade went by road
11 whereas most global
trade is maritime transported.
Column (1) represents the simplest specification of the gravity equation as reported by
McCallum (1995). The home variable for intra-national trade is 5.75 (exp (1.75)),
which means that on average, the EU10 countries export about 6 times more with
itself than with another EU country after adjusting for income (size) and distance. This
result suggests that the home effect is in the European Union is substantially lower
than the home bias estimate found for Canada by McCallum (1995) and Helliwell
(1997) and Wei (1996) for OECD countries, close to Nitsch’ (2000) estimates, but
considerably larger than Wei (1996) estimates for the EU.
In  column  (2),  a  language  and  land  border  (adjacency)  dummy  are  added  to  the
traditional gravity equation. We follow Helliwell (1997) and Nitsch (2000) method of
assigning a value of one only in the case of bilateral trade flows between countries that
share a common language and land border. This permits us to capture the home effect
of a country relatively to another country by not taking into account that they share a
common border and language
12. In addition, our sample consists of only three member
countries that share a common border and language. Consequently, the home bias can
be interpreted as how much a country trade with itself than with another unrelated
country.  By  subtracting  the  coefficients  of  the  dummies  from  the  home  bias
coefficient and taking the antilog of the remaining result, we obtain an estimate of
4.17  for  more  intense  trade  between  a  country  than  with  adjacent  neighbors  with
which  it  shares  a  common  language.  It  can  be  seen  from  column  (2)  that  adding
language and adjacency clearly augments the border effect, which can be explained by
the intuitive definition of these categorical variables. This home bias’ estimate is fairly
close to Nitsch (2000) results.
                                                          
11 Eurostat, as quoted by Chen (2000)
12 Wei (1996) also assigns a one to the dummy for common language and adjacency for countries that
trade with itself (the additional observation) and can be interpreted as “how much more intensely does a
country trade with itself than with another country with which it shares a common border and a common
language” Helliwell (1997).  Helliwell (1997) provides a detailed discussion on justifying this method.Moving to column (3), the model adds a remoteness variable for both importing and
exporting countries. These added variables are statistically significant; however, the
coefficient on the remoteness of exporting countries does not have the correct sign.
Nitsch  (2000)  also  reports  a  wrong  sign  but  the  home  bias  remains  unchanged.
However, our results show a significant increase (from 2.39 to 2.7) in the home bias
effect, which is in line with Wei (1996) and Helliwell (1997) claim. Our estimates
suggest that countries tend to trade 14 times more with each other after controlling for
distance, income, language, adjacency and remoteness.
An interesting point to note is that our remoteness variable is affected by the sample.
We have seen from figure 1 that countries such as Spain, Greece, Portugal, Finland
and Sweden relatively show a high remoteness coefficient and this should affect the
home bias estimate. As a robustness check, Nitsch (2000) shows that by adding Spain
and Portugal, the inclusion of the remoteness variable raises the estimated home bias
from a factor 11 to 16
13. To test for this, we constructed a second sample that excludes
Finland, Austria and Sweden and ran the regression from 1990 till 1995 to represent
the EU12 during that time. As shown in column (4), the results do not confirm Nitsch
(2000) finding; namely, that adding or dropping some countries little affect the home
bias estimate in the European Union. On the contrary, we can see that the home bias
increases  from  2.7  to  2.98.  This  rise  can  be  partially  an  indication  that  can  be
attributed to a different time period or it may also suggest that the home estimate may
collide  with  the  presence  of  any  of  the  ten  importing  countries  in  the  estimation
sample. We will return to this issue in section 7.
6.2.  Technical Barriers To Trade
We  now  to  turn  to  table  A2  and  apply  the  gravity  model  to  two  broad  sectoral
aggregates, those were technical regulations do not cause barriers to trade (column 1)
and  an  aggregate  of  sectors  subject  to  New  Approach,  Old  Approach,  Mutual
Recognition Principle and a small number of sectors where multiple harmonization
                                                          
13 However, the inclusion of Portugal and Spain little affects the home bias estimate when the
remoteness variable is not added to the equation. This makes it interesting for my analysis to investigate
the sensitivity of the remoteness coefficient to selecting a country sample.approaches apply (column 2). The explanatory powers are large in each regression and
the income variables are strongly significant. The income effect for the exporter is
larger  for  sectors  subject  to  no  technical  harmonization.    The  distance  variable  is
smaller for sectors that are subject to the harmonization of technical regulations and
the adjacency variable is larger.
The  estimated  parameters  of  home  bias  are  large  and  strongly  significant  in  both
samples. We find that home bias remains substantial for products where the EU has
sought to introduce harmonized technical regulations to remove technical barriers to
trade. The home bias is 13.19. On the other hand, we find a home bias of 16.7 for
products where differences in technical regulations are not deemed to be important
constraints upon intra-EU trade. These results suggest that technical barriers to trade
are  relevant  in  explaining  home  bias;  nevertheless,  we  would  expect  that  those
industries where no TBT’s persist would have a lower home bias than those industries
where the EU has sought to introduce harmonized technical harmonization to remove
TBT’s. This suggests that factors other than differences in technical regulation must
constrain trade 
14.   We will return to this issue in section 8.
Finally,  we  provide  results  for  our  three  groups  of  products  where  technical
regulations are important grouped according to the approach adopted in the EU to the
removal of technical barriers to trade (column 3-5) and for a small number of sectors
where  multiple  harmonization  approaches  apply  (column  6).    In  all  four  cases,
distance and incomes are strong and significant trade determinants. The parameters
are not really similar across the four groups. Distance has a much lower dampening
effect for old approach products and we also observe that the income elasticities for
both  the  importing  and  exporting  countries  are  more  balanced.  Home  bias  is
significant for all sectors but is smaller for products under mutual recognition. These
results suggest that the home bias estimate is important but that the extent of this bias
                                                          
14 Head and Mayer (2000) find that crude indicators of non-tariff barriers cannot explain the cross-
industry variation in the size of estimated home bias. In Brenton and Vancauteren (2001) we find
similar conclusion and suggest a number of arguments other than TBT’s that may explain the presence
of home bias in the European Union (taste differences, clustering of production, …) .against trade with other EU countries relative to internal trade varies according to the
approach to the removal of technical barriers to trade.
6.2.1. Evolution over time
We now turn to the analysis of changes in home bias over time. In particular we are
interested whether reduction in border effects occurred for sectors that are identified
as having technical barriers to trade. In 1995, Finland, Austria and Sweden became
member of the European Community and we have seen that this change in status has
influenced the temporal evolution of the home bias effect. The year-by-year evolution
can be best seen from figure 3 and 4, where we use a single OLS regression with
constant coefficients but keep the constant and the home bias time dependent. For the
period 1990-1998, we observe that the border effects have not decreased for sectors
that are prone to technical regulations. Figure 3 shows clearly that the border effect
reduces slightly for sectors subject to no technical barriers to trade. The home bias in
the European Union has dropped only gradually from about factor 20 to factor 17. For
sector where TBT’s are important home bias remains at a level below the NTB’s
sector but shows relatively higher movement and between 1996 and 1997, it returns to
the same level of the base year.
Finally, we turn to the evolution of border effects at a more disaggregated level for
TBT sectors.  This can be seen from Figure 4. The intensity of internal trade relative
to EU trade has increased for New Approach sectors, exactly those sectors were we
would anticipate that the impact of the Single Market would be most pronounced and
has fallen slightly for Old Approach sectors when we compare 1998 to 1991. This
may also be that the full impact on trade of NA directives issued during the 1990’s has
yet to be implemented. It may even be due to the fact that in some cases the New
Approach harmonization, over time, has replaced the traditional ‘Old Approach’ for
some products
15.
                                                          
15 Council resolution (1985) outlines a model directive for the selection criteria for old approach
products to be suitable for the new approach.Figure 4 also shows that home bias for products under mutual recognition has the
lowest  level  of  border  effects  and  virtually  remains  unchanged  between  1991  and
1998 (border effect of 3.14 as against 3.11). Here we also might have expected that
the application of the mutual recognition as a powerful tool for economic integration
would  have  increased  cross-border  trade.  Related  literature  (COM1999,  Pelkmans
(1996))  points  out  that  there  are  still  obstacles  with  the  application  of  the  MRP
preventing full benefit of a Single Market from being gained. These difficulties are
merely related to a lack of confidence in acts adopted by the authorities of the member
states and administrative delays
16.
We  note  that  between  1990  and  1991,  there  is  a  rapid  increase  in  the  home  bias
estimates. From our analysis, this rapid increase in the home estimate collides with the
presence of Greece in the estimation sample (see section 7). We also observe that in
1993,  home  bias  seems  to  jump  under  all  sector  categories  coefficient.  This
observation can be attributed to the fact that after 1992, the European Union adopted a
new system called Intrastat in which companies no longer reported at the customs
level  but  directly  to  their  respective  national  statistical  institutes  and  only  if  a
minimum amount is exceeded. It is therefore likely that Instrastat underestimates trade
flows. As the methodology of production data collections did not change, there will be
some upward bias in the home bias coefficient. We can do little to beyond noting the
problem.
7. Statistical Tests
The results that we have obtained so far in our analysis are subject to greater doubt
than the standard errors would suggest. However, few studies have addressed the issue
at  the  heart  of  this  paper  so  that  suitable  comparisons  by  which  to  assess  the
                                                          
16 Pelkmans (1998) reports that MR is demanding because its credibility in the market place critically
hinges on very extensive monitoring, accessibility of the monitoring authority for complaints and the
legal and manpower capacity to impose legal and easy-access to justice.robustness of the results presented here are not available. Two important sources of
doubt remain: endogeneity and outliers.
7.1. Outliers
 
  We have seen from the previous section that outliers may exert a disproportionate
influence on the fit of the estimation equation or on the estimates of parameters of
interest. To correct for normality we use a method whereby the detection of influential
cases  calls  for  diagnostic  analysis  that  attempt  to  summarize  the  information  on
normality  into  a  single  statistic.  DFITS  creates  such  an  index  that  enables  us  to
understand the influence or importance of each case in our fitted model and solves for
the outlier problem. The measure can be interpreted as a scaled difference between
predicted values for the ith case when the regression is estimated with and without the
ith observation. It is scaled by the standard deviation of the fit. First we tested for
DFITS values greater as the cutoff value suggested by Belsey, Kuh and Welsh (1980,
pp.  28
17)  who  suggest  that  DFIT  values  greater  than  2*(square  root  (number  of
variables/number  observations))  deserve  greater  observation.  We  then  used  the
bounded  influence  estimation  procedure  in  order  to  minimize  the  influence  of
observations  with  large  studentized  residuals  and  DFIT  values  instead  of  deleting
them. This procedure of bounded influence does not appear to affect our results.
 
  We  also  verify  if  the  variability  in  the  specified  variables,  in  particular  the  home
estimate, does not collide with the presence of any of the 10 importing countries in the
estimation sample. By using the specification from the regression outlined in column
2, table A1, we sequentially remove one country at a time and obtain one border effect
for  each  year.  In  summary,  the  border  effect  differ  somewhat  on  average,  which
confirms our previous analysis that results are robust to small changes in the sample.
The largest deviation from the border effect (2.39) is induced when Greece is omitted
and we also obtain a smaller interval between year-to-year home bias estimates for
1990 and 1991. The R
2 changes from 0.92 when Greece is omitted to 0.88 when Spain
                                                          
17 See Maddale p. 488 and section 7.2. for a description of this method.or France is omitted. This analysis suggests that Greece might be a possible outlier
and may exert a disproportionate influence on the estimated home bias. We identify 6
high  influential  cases  [DFIT  value>2*sqrt(number  of  var./number  of  obs.)]  with







  A  first  check  is  to  test  the  endogeneity  in  our  equation.  First  as  emphasized  by
McCallum (1995), GDP and exports are most likely jointly determined in equilibrium.
Unfortunately, the authors note that the lack of instruments does not permit to deal
adequately with this problem. Nevertheless Wei (1996) and McCallum (1995) use the
log of the population as an instrument for the log of the GDP variables. We confirm
their results in our estimates and conclude that this modification has no effect on the
fit of the regression. Equation (5) in Table A1 repeats the specification of equation (3)
with  a  small  difference  in  the  estimation.  In  order  to  deal  adequately  with  this
problem, several endowment measures are used as instruments. The set of instruments
are (1) the GDP’s from the two previous years - this should be sufficiently to capture
the variability from cyclical or temporary disturbances, (2) current population and (3)
the ratio of unit labor costs in total manufacturing of the importing and exporting
country from the current and two previous years 
18. The relative unit labor costs are
then calculated by dividing the unit labor cost of the importing country by a weighted
average of the unit labor cost of the exporting country. We use the share of each
exporter in total EU exports as the weighting factor. As can be seen from the results,
there is a slightly increase in the goodness of fit and the estimated border effect for the
period 1990-1998 is slightly larger.
 
                                                          
18 Tests have been run using GDP and unit labour costs from one, two and three years previously as
instruments and we found that the equation actually fits better as a lag of two years are used for the
instruments.  Extreme Bound Analysis
 
  At present we conclude that the home bias estimate appears to be relatively robust,
being consistently found in several studies, but its precise estimate is uncertain. An
essential question arises of how much of this bias we have found is influenced by the
choice  of  specification.    As  shown  by  Temple  (2000),  ‘extreme  bound  analysis’
(EBA) is essentially a mean of reporting an upper and lower bound for parameter
estimates  thereby  indicating  the  sensitivity  to  the  choice  of  the  specification.  The
upper and lower bound are based on all possible linear combinations of a subset of Z-
variables in addition to a set of X-variables that are always included in the regression.
The highest and lowest values for the coefficient of the variable of interest that can’t
be rejected at the 5% significance level and remains at the same sign at the extreme
bounds is then referred as robust variable. The pool of variables we from which we
allow  the  EBA  to  choose  Z-variables  are  adjacency,  language,  population,  the
importing and exporting remoteness measure and the ratio of importing and exporting
unit labor costs, RULC
19. Table A3 presents the EBA test for the home bias estimate.
The table also shows the p-values of some diagnostic tests. Any p-value under 0.05
indicates that the model fails the corresponding diagnostic test at the 5% significance
level where the null is that the model is correctly specified. The general message from
these results is that the home bias estimate is robust and positive at both bounds.
However, we note that the residuals are not normally distributed. To provide some
evidence concerning our finding (see section 7.1.), we also examined the sensitivity of
our results when we exclude Greece in the sample. The bounds did not importantly
change;  however,  we  note  that  for  all  regressions,  the  results  of  the  Cooks  and




                                                          
19 For each of the 120 sectors considered in this study, we calculate the nominal unit labor costs (ULC)
for each industry, l, and country i defined as UL = (W/(Y/N)), where W is employee compensation, Y is
the GDP and N is employment. This indicator shows the relationship between how much each worker is
paid and the amount each worker produces.8. Interpreting the border effect
 
  A number of authors have found evidence that the border effect is an important feature
characterizing the international exchange between countries, but we do not clearly
understand what the dummy variable we have called the border effect might actually
be measuring. It is here that the fragility of the theoretical underpinnings of the gravity
model proves to be a hindrance. One possibility is policy-induced trade restrictions,
such as technical barriers to trade; however, these cannot be the only factor since we
find substantial and persistent border effects for sectors where technical regulations
are not expected to constrain trade flows and sectors where there have been substantial
efforts to remove regulatory barriers to trade still reflect large border effects. This
suggests that policy-related barriers are of relatively minor importance to explain the
presence of the border effect
20.
 
  First of all, the home bias that we, and others, have identified seems to be too large to
be consistent only with the presence of trade barriers. Theory (Wei, 1996; Anderson
and  van  Wincoop,  2001)  shows  that  the  border  effect  depends  upon  the  tariff
equivalent  of  the  border  barrier  (e.g.  tariffs,  quotas,  exchange  rate  variability,
transation  costs,  non-tariff  barriers,  etc.)  and  the  elasticity  of  substitution  between
domestically produced goods and imports. Taking a representative value of the border
effect of from this study of 3 and an elasticity of substitution of 20 generates a tariff
equivalent of over 16 percent, way in excess of the current levels of average tariffs in
the EU of around 4 percent.
 
  Secondly, the calculated intra-country distances relative to international distances are
much smaller. If this internal distance is over-estimated the border effect will be given
even more weight in the regression leading to an overestimated border effect. This
observation is not in line with standard trade theory because it tells us that the inverse
                                                                                                                                                                     
20 Head and Mayer (2000) find that crude indicators of non-tariff barriers cannot explain the cross-
industry variation in the size of estimated home bias.relationship of transportation costs (approximated by distance) with trade increases
when transportation costs are high. By contrast, our measure suggests that trade with a
country itself, captured by the border effect increases, as internal distance rises
21. Yet,
the empirical evidence supporting the idea that declining trade with rising distances
seems to be only warranted for international trade flows.
 
  Home  bias  may  have  an  effect  on  both  foreign  (imports)  and  domestic  prices.
Consider the case when there is a large consensus for home bias in domestic goods,
this may raise domestic prices and could prevent foreign goods to enter the domestic
market (for a given identical product). This may well explain our finding for a small
variability in home bias throughout time. Neven, and al. (1991) modeled the behavior
of prices when demand is subject to home bias characterized in a non-cooperative
equilibrium. Their analysis based upon an equilibrium condition confirms that when
national  bias  in  favor  of  domestic  goods  occurs,  the  domestic  price  exceeds  the
foreign price even if some consumers are in favor for foreign goods. They conclude
that relative higher domestic prices increase the domestic market share and stimulate
domestic trade.
 
  It  is  well  known  that  consumer  attaches  different  values  to  products,  which  are
otherwise identical but produced in different countries. Yet, the body of empirical and
survey literature, supporting the idea that country of origin matters, seems also to
warrant  a  specific  analysis.  Johanson  and  Thorelli  (1985)
22  argue  that  American
perceptions of cars cannot be fully explained by the characteristics and observe that
the country of origin can explain the discrepancy between domestic and foreign bias.
In the same line, according to Papadopoulos et al. (1987) “French consumers think
highly of their own products, relative to those from other consumers. Coupled with
their tendency to pay more attention to country of origin…this national pride would
indicate greater difficulties for exporters who try to penetrate the French market.
 
                                                          
21 In a simple exercise, Wei (1996) let the intra-national distance be larger by 25%, leaving
international distances unchanged; the reported home bias coefficient was about 25% larger.
22 Quoted in Neven et al. (1991)  However, the results reported in Knight (1999)
23 appear to be rather convincing and
suggest that not only the country of origin matters. The author shows on basis of a
survey of US consumer preferences regarding microwave ovens and dishes that US
made products were preferred over products made in Japan regardless of whether the
company was American or Japanese owned.” This finding reflect the notion that when
comparing foreign versus home goods, consumers appear to be rather influenced by
the country in which a product is made than by the manufacturer’s national origin.
From  these  sources  of  information,  the  question  then  arises  of  how  much  of  this
‘country-of-origin  effect’  and/or  ‘location-of-production-effect’  linked  to  domestic
preferences can be can  be  accounted  for  in  the  home  bias.  Knight  (1999)  finding
interprets that the diversity of home bias matters and is akin to an enlargement in the
scope of product differentiation
24- products differentiated by local firms and foreign
firms operating in the same country. This can have a negative effect of imports. The
reason is that both firms will gain market power in a same country and prevent foreign
good imports from further entry.
 
9. Conclusion
Consistent with the existing literature, we find substantial home bias in applications
using  the  gravity  model.  Firstly,  we  find  substantial  home  bias  for  sectors  where
differences in technical regulations are not thought to be important. Thus technical
barriers to trade cannot be the only factor linked to the home bias effect and other
attributes such as differences in preferences, price competition and other non-tariff
barriers  may  also  explain  the  presence  of  home  bias.    Secondly,  where  technical
barriers to trade are deemed to be present we find that mutual recognition sectors
exhibit the smallest home bias; nevertheless sectors where there are regulatory barriers
still reflect a large home bias.  Based upon the analysis on the evolution of home bias
in the EU, we find no evidence that the Single Market has increased the intensity of
                                                          
23 As quoted in Brenton and al. (2001)
24 -products differentiated from those produced by local firms and foreign firms operating in the same
country-intra-EU trade relative to domestic trade for products where differences in technical
regulations are important, the focus of the Single Market Program.
For further research, we have not explored the empirical analysis on home bias when
consumer preferences are non-homothetic. Almost all theoretical derivations of the
gravity  model  are  based  upon  CES  preferences.  This  imposes  homotheticity  on
preferences.    Hence,  the  assumption  of  a  constant  proportion  of  total  expenditure
allocated to each commodity is may be unrealistic. An alternative approach would be
to  derive  a  gravity  equation  from  a  more  flexible  underlying  utility  function.  The
hypothetical framework is then to assume that there are differences in tastes across
countries and within this that consumers are biased towards domestic goods.Bibliography
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Figure 1: Remoteness of countries 



























































































































1200 Coke ovens 2210 Iron and steel
1300 Extr. Of petroleum and natural
gaz
2240 NF materials
2210 Iron and steel (other) 2410 Clay products for constr.
Purposes
2310 Extraction of building material 2420 Cement
2510 Basic industry chem, petrochem. 2470 Manuf. of glass
2550 Paint, varnishing, printing ink 3140 Structural metal products
3166 Manufacture of metal furniture 3150 Boilers, reservoirs, tanks
2600 Man-made fibers 3165 Domestic heating
appliances
3610 Shipbuilding 3210 Agricultural mach.
Tractors
3620 Manuf of railway rol. Stock 3220 Machine tools working
metal
3630 Manuf. of cycles, motor cycles 3230 Textile machines, sewing
3640 Aerospace equipment 3240 Machines for food and
chem Industry
4110 Manufacture of oils and fats 3250 Machines for iron and
steel
4240 Ethyl alcohol, spirit dist. 3260 Transmission equipment
4250 Wine of fresh grapes, cider 3270 Equipm. For use in spec.
branches
4270 Brewing and malting 3720 Medical and surg.
Equipment
4280 Soft drinks 4620 Semi-finished goods
4360 Knitting industry 4630 Carpentry
4370 Textile finishing 4830 Construction products
4530 Manuf. of clothing 4910 Manufact. Of articles of
jewelry
4550 Manuf. of household textiles 4940 Toys
4560 Manuf. of furs
4670 Manuf. of wooden furniture
4830 Processing of plasticsTABLE 2
NACE Old approach NACE No
Regulations
1100 Extraction of solid fuels 2110 Extr. Prep. Of ore
1400 Mineral oil refining 2120 Extr. Prep. Of non-
fer met. Ores
1510 Extr. Nuclear materials 2220 Man. of steel tubes
1520 Production of nuclear
materials
2230 Draw. Cold rolling
of steel
1700 Water supply 2320 Salt
2470 Man. Of glass 2480 Man. of ceramic
goods
2580 Soap, detergents 3160 Tools and finished
goods
3510 Manuf. of ass. Motor vehicles 3520 Man. bodies for
motor vehicles
3530 Man. Parts for motor vehicles 3730 Optical
instruments
3630 Man. Of cycles, motor cycles 3740 Man. of watches
4120 Prep. Of meat 4310 Wool industry
4130 Man. Of dairy products 4320 Cotton industry
4140 Proc. Of fruit and vegetables 4330 Silk industry
4150 Proc. Preserv. of fish 4350 Jute industry
4160 Grain milling 4410 Tanning; dressing
of leather
4170 Man. of spaghetti 4420 Leather products
4180 Starch and starch products 4510 Footwear
4190 Bread and flour 4610 Sawing and proc.
Of wood
4210 Cocoa and sugar conf. 4640 Man of wooden
containers
4220 Animal and poultry food 4670 Man. of wooden
furniture
4290 Tobacco products 4730 Printing and allied
industries
4710 Manuf. of pulp and paper 4810 Man. of rubber
products
4720 Proc. Of paper and board 482 Rubber tires
4740 Publishing 492 Musical
instruments
493 photographTABLE A1: Home country bias in the European Union, 1990-1998, Estimation of the
                     gravity  model applied to total trade













































































































































































































































2 0.87 0.86 0.86 0.87 0.88
Estimation
Method
Weighted-SUR Weighted-SUR Weighted-SUR Weighted-SUR Weighted-SUR-
IV
Observations 10*14*9 10*14*9 10*14*9 10*11*9 10*14*9
Notes: Bounded influence estimation. Robust (White Heteroskedasticity consistent) standard errors are
 reported. 
** denotes significance at 1 per cent and 
* denotes significance at 5 per cent.
We define the coefficient of determination R
2 for the system as 1-(residuals sum of squares/total sum of
squares).TABLE A2: Home country bias in the European Union, 1990-1998, Estimation of the





















































































































































































































































































































































Observations 10*14*9 10*14*9 10*14*9 10*14*9 10*14*9 10*14*9
Notes: Bounded influence estimation. Robust (White Heteroskedasticity consistent) standard errors are
 reported. 
** denotes significance at 1 per cent and 
* denotes significance at 5 per cent.
We define the coefficient of determination R
2 for the system as 1-(residuals sum of squares/total sum of












1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
technical barriers to trade non-technical barriers to trade total trade
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High: 2.59 6.47 0.91 Adj, Pop, Remi 0.00 0.07 0.004
Total
Trade
Base: 1.75 4.67 0.87 0.00 0.82 0.00
Low: 1.67 3.78 0.88 Remj, Pop 0.06 0.97 0.01
High: 3.41 5.75 0.91 Adj, Pop, Remi 0.00 0.11 0.001
TBT Base: 2.06 3.98 0.88 0.00 0.91 0.00
Low: 1.86 3.67 0.91 Adj, Remj, Lang 0.09 0.62 0.02
High: 3.75 6.46 0.91 Adj, Remi, RULC 0.00 0.01 0.00
NTB Base: 2.87 5.87 0.90 0.00 0.14 0.00
Low: 2.14 4.94 0.91 Remj, Pop 0.02 0.54 0.005
High: 4.70 6.02 0.87 Adj, Remi 0.08 0.03 0.007
OA Base: 2.96 4.37 0.84 0.07 0.74 0.00
Low: 2.54 4.38 0.87 Remj, Pop 0.11 0.94 0.04
High: 4.53 6.57 0.88 Adj, Remi, Lang 0.07 0.33 0.06
MRP Base: 2.53 4.01 0.85 0.05 0.84 0.017
Low: 2.17 3.32 0.86 Adj, Remj 0.16 0.90 0.02
High: 4.31 6.39 0.91 Adj, Pop, Remi 0.04 0.01 0.00
NA Base: 2.62 4.31 0.88 0.03 0.11 0.01
Low: 1.90 3.92 0.90 Remj, Pop 0.11 0.67 0.14
aThe table reports the coefficient of home bias in regressions which also include the importing and
exporting GDP’s and distance. We define the coefficient of determination  R
2  for  the  system  as  1-
(residuals sum of squares/total sum of squares).
bThe diagnostic test for normality of the residuals is based upon the Shapiro-Wilk W test. The p-value 
is based on the assumption that the distribution is normal.
cCooks-Weisberg test.